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MISLEADING EMPLOYER COMMUNICATIONS AND THE
SECURITIES FRAUD IMPLICATIONS OF THE
EMPLOYEE AS INVESTOR
JENNIFER O'HARE*
I. INTRODUCTIONF OLLOWING the disclosure of Enron's accounting irregularities, the
American public was inundated with hundreds of stories describing
the disastrous effects of Enron's securities fraud. To me, the saddest sto-
ries involved Enron's employees. They lost their investment in Enron.
Many of them lost their retirement savings. And they all lost their jobs.
They also lost their trust in corporate management. The same sad stories
were repeated over and over again. Employees were urged to invest in
Enron stock. When the stock price started to fall and when concerns
about possible accounting irregularities were raised, management called
employee meetings and reassured their employees that all was well. Rely-
ing on these assurances, employee investors held on to their Enron stock,
even when-in retrospect-it appeared foolish to do so.'
When the Enron fact pattern is carefully examined, it becomes clear
that employee investors are particularly vulnerable to securities fraud com-
mitted by company management. Company management can capitalize
on the employment relationship and communicate directly with their em-
ployees. These employer communications may be misleading. And al-
though employer communications often encourage employees to invest in
company stock, they are left largely unregulated by the federal securities
laws.
This Article begins by reviewing the employee investor phenomenon.
In Part II, I observe that employers typically encourage company invest-
ment by their employees, and employees generally respond by heavily in-
*Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law; B.S.E., The Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania; J.D., The George Washington School of
Law. I gratefully acknowledge that research for this Article was supported by a
summer stipend from the Villanova University School of Law.
1. Consider the following interchange between a television journalist and an
Enron employee, which occurred shortly after Enron's accounting irregularities
were disclosed:
CBS AnchorJulie Chen: Did you think of bailing out or were you assured
that your money was safe?
Enron employee: We were assured that our money was safe.
Ms. Chen: How so?
Enron employee: Because we trusted Enron. They kept telling us that the
stock was gonna go back up.
Ms. Chen: Who was saying all this to you, Tom? ...
Enron employee: Corporate management.
The Early Show (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 11, 2001).
(1217)
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vesting in company securities. Part III of this Article continues by
highlighting powerful ways companies can communicate with their em-
ployee investors-through such media as employee newsletters, employee
meetings and employer e-mails. I show that these employer communica-
tions are often promotional, purposefully stimulating employee invest-
ment in the company.
In Part IV, I argue that employee investors are particularly vulnerable
to securities fraud committed by their employer. First, I demonstrate that
employer communications pose a unique risk of misleading employee in-
vestors, primarily because employer communications are secret in nature.
I then show that employee investors are more likely to believe misleading
employer communications because of the natural tendency of employees
to trust the senior management of their employer. Finally, I point out that
employee investors suffer disproportionately when misleading employer
communications are made, because employees tend to invest so heavily in
company stock.
In Part V of this Article, I demonstrate that the anti-fraud provisions
of the federal securities laws do not adequately address the vulnerability of
employee investors. Most of the anti-fraud provisions are simply not appli-
cable to misleading employer communications. Moreover, because em-
ployer communications are not publicly made, securities fraud actions are
unlikely to be brought, either by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) or by private plaintiffs. Furthermore, many misleading employer
communications go unpunished under the federal securities laws because
employee investors who have been fraudulently encouraged to hold com-
pany securities do not have standing to sue under Rule 10b-5.
In Part VI, I propose that certain types of employer communications
should be disclosed to the SEC. If companies are required to disclose em-
ployer communications to the SEC, the employer communications would
be subjected to critical scrutiny by outsiders and to potential securities
fraud liability, making it less likely that employers will make misleading
statements to their employees. Thus, I call upon the SEC to promulgate a
rule that will require public companies to disclose all employer communi-
cations that (1) are widely disseminated to company employees, and (2)
are reasonably likely to cause employees to purchase company stock or to
refrain from selling company stock. If adopted, such a rule would hope-
fully reduce the number of sad stories told by employees in the future.
II. THE EMPLOYEE INVESTOR PHENOMENON
A. Employers Encourage Employee Investment
Employee investment has become increasingly important to corpora-
tions. Many public companies encourage their employees to purchase
1218 [Vol. 48: p. 1217
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common stock. Several reasons are typically cited.2 First, employee invest-
ment is commonly thought to increase worker productivity.' The conven-
tional wisdom is that employees who own company stock have an incentive
to work harder, leading to improved company performance and higher
stock prices. In addition, company managers may view employee investors
as shareholders who will be pro-management. By keeping stock in friendly
hands, employee investment has an entrenchment effect on management.
Finally, compensating employees through stock awards or by stock options
may provide attractive tax or other benefits to the company.
To encourage employee investment, most public companies offer cer-
tain employee benefit plans which provide incentives for employees to
purchase company stock. 4 Two of the most popular employee benefit
plans are employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and 401(k) plans. An
ESOP is an employee benefit plan in the form of a trust that permits a
company to make tax-deductible contributions to the ESOP to purchase
company stock, or to simply make tax-deductible contributions of its stock
to the ESOP. 5 The company stock is then allocated to individual employ-
ees through some pre-determined formula such as salary or years of ser-
vice. The employees participating in the ESOP do not own the stock
immediately; rather, it is typically subject to a five year vesting require-
ment. After vesting, the employee receives his company stock only after
he leaves employment, dies or becomes disabled.
A 401 (k) plan is an employee benefit plan that permits employees to
deduct part of their pay on a pre-tax basis and place it in an investment
fund set up by the company.6 In a 401(k) plan, employees are required to
have several investment choices and are free to allocate their investments
in different ways. These investment options may be managed by the com-
pany, but are often managed by an outside firm such as Fidelity Invest-
ments or Vanguard. Most 401(k) plans include a company stock fund-
2. There is substantial literature addressing the perceived benefits of em-
ployee ownership of company stock. See, e.g., Enron and Beyond: Enhancing Worker
Retirement Security; Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations,
House Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 107th Cong. 32 (Feb. 13, 2002) (testi-
mony of Douglas Kruse, Professor, Rutgers University); Olivia S. Mitchell & Ste-
phen P. Utkas, The Role of Company Stock in Defined Contribution Plans, PENSION RES.
COUNCIL WORKING PAPER 20024, at 14-21; Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments
in Employer Securities: More Is Not Always Better, 15 YALEJ. ON REG. 61, 73-77 (1998);
see also The National Center for Employee Ownership, A Comprehensive Overview of
Employee Ownership (visited Dec. 7, 2002) at http://www.nceo.org/library/
overview.html.
3. See Stabile, supra note 2, at 73.
4. The federal securities laws define "employee benefit plan" as "any written
purchase, savings, option, bonus, appreciation, profit sharing, thrift, incentive,
pension or similar plan or written compensation contract solely for employees,
directors, general partners, trustees (where the registrant is a business trust), of-
ficers, or consultants or advisors." Securities Act of 1933 Rule 405, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.405 (2002).
5. See I.R.C. § 409(a) (2) (2002).
6. See 1.R.C. § 401(k) (2002).
2003] 1219
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an investment vehicle consisting entirely of company stock-as an invest-
ment option, which permits employees to allocate some or all of their con-
tributions to company stock.7 In addition, most 401(k) plans provide that
the company will match employee contributions, often in company stock
contributed to the company's ESOP. Unlike an ESOP, in a 401(k) plan
the employee does not actually own the company stock; instead, he owns
an interest in the 401(k) plan, which may consist largely of company
stock.8
B. Employees Tend to Invest Heavily in Company Stock
Employees tend to invest heavily in company stock, often through
their 401(k) plans. For example, one study has estimated that of the
twenty-three million people who have access to company stock through
their defined contribution plans, eleven-million employees hold more
than twenty percent of their assets in company stock. And 5.3 million em-
ployees are estimated to hold more than sixty percent of their assets in
company stock.9 Such high concentration levels are widely seen as dan-
gerous. Financial planners commonly advise investors to have no more
than ten percent of their holdings in one company. 10 A diversification
strategy is even more important for employee investors; if their employer
suffers an economic downturn, employees could lose their investments
and their jobs.1 '
These concentration levels are also reflected in the holdings of de-
fined contribution plans. When companies allow employees to invest in
company stock, a significant proportion of the company's plan assets are
in company stock. For example, a study conducted by the Congressional
Research Service indicated that company stock comprised thirty-eight per-
cent of the assets held by the defined contribution plans of large corpora-
7. Moreover, large plans-those with more than 5000 employees-are even
more likely to have a company stock option in their 401 (k) plans. See Jack L.
VanDerhei, Company Stock in 401(k) Plans: Results of a Survey of ISCEBS Members,
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RES. INST. SPECIAL REP. 4 (Jan. 31, 2002).
8. An interest in a contributory 401 (k) plan is a "security" for purposes of the
federal securities laws. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 570
(1979) (holding that interests in compulsory non-contributory pension plan are
not securities for purposes of federal securities laws). Similarly, an interest in a
voluntary ESOP constitutes a security. See Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor
Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 572-79 (10th Cir. 1991).
9. See Mitchell & Utkas, supra note 2, at 11; see also VanDerhei, supra note 7, at
4 (highlighting that in plans permitting employees to invest in employer stock,
42% of employees have between 10-50% of their holdings in employer stock and
18% of employees have more than 50% of their holdings in employer stock).
10. See, e.g., Kathy M. Kristof, 401(k) Sticker Shock Can Be a Wake-up Call, L.A.
TIMES, Jul. 21, 2002, at C-I (stating that "the rough rule of thumb is that you
shouldn't have more than 5%-10% of your assets in your own company's stock").
11. See, e.g., Sharon Epperson, Don't Bet It All on Your Employer: The Plunge of
Enron Stock Serves as a Warning That Workers Should Not Invest 7oo Much in Their
Company, TIME, Dec. 3, 2001, at 79 (discussing why employees should follow diversi-
fication investment strategy).
1220
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tions.' 2  Other studies also support the conclusion that defined
contribution plans tend to have high concentrations of company stock.
13
At certain companies, the percentage of plan ownership of company stock
is even higher than the numbers indicated by the Congressional Research
Service study. 14 For example, more than sixty percent of the Enron
401(k) plan was invested in Enron stock. 15
Why do employees tend to invest so heavily in company stock? There
are a number of explanations. 16 First, employees may simply believe that
employer stock is a superior investment.17 Employees may also invest out
of a sense of loyalty to their employer.18 There may also be peer pressure
to invest in company stock. 9 Finally, as discussed below, employees are
often encouraged by senior management to invest in the company.
20
High levels of concentration may occur because employees choose to
invest in employer stock. However, concentrated employer stock holdings
are also a result of employer matching programs. 2 1 To encourage em-
ployee saving, companies often match employee contributions to their
401 (k) plans. Sometimes, the employer matches in cash, and the em-
ployee can then allocate the money as he pleases. Often, however, the
12. See Patrick J. Purcell, Employer Stock in Retirement Plans: Investment Risk and
Retirement Security, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REP. FOR CONG. RL31507, at 10 Uuly 12,
2002).
13. For example, a study conducted by the Employee Benefit Research Insti-
tute (EBRI) found that where company stock is offered either as an employer
match or an investment option, 32% of the plan assets were in company stock. See
VanDerhei, supra note 7, at 2. For a discussion of other studies, see Purcell, supra
note 12, at 8-12.
14. For example, more than 90% of the Procter & Gamble defined contribu-
tion plan was invested in company stock. See Steven Greenhouse, Response to 401(k)
Proposals Follows Party Lines, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2002, at C-1; see also id. (listing other
plans with high concentrations of company stock).
15. See PatrickJ. Purcell, The Enron Bankruptcy and Employer Stock in Retirement
Plans, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REP. FOR CONG. RS21115, at 3 (Jan. 22, 2002) (dis-
cussing concentration levels of employer stock in 401 (k) plans).
16. The literature in this area is substantial. For a good overview, see SusanJ.
Stabile, Another Look at 401(k) Plan Investments in Employer Securities, 35 J. MARSHALL
L. REv. 539, 547-52 (2002).
17. And, in fact, behavioral studies indicate that employees may have an opti-
mistic bias towards their company and its securities. See Susan J. Stabile, The Behav-
ior of Defined Contribution Plan Participants, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 71, 91 (2002).
18. See id.
19. See Daniel Altman, Bush Promises a Look at Employee Risks, but Experts Say
Solutions Won't Be Easy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2002, at C-i (noting that "some employ-
ees felt social pressures to put even their own money into company stock"); Steven
Greenhouse, Plan to Put Limits on 401(k) Holdings Draws Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
2002, at C-1 (noting that "[a] t some companies, not to hold large amounts of com-
pany stock is viewed as disloyalty").
20. See Greenhouse, supra note 19, at C-1 (revealing that "employers press
employees to load up on company stock in their 401(k) plans and elsewhere").
For further discussion of how Enron managers encouraged employees to purchase
and hold company stock, see infra Part 11I.
21. See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 2, at 11-13.
2003] 1221
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employer match is made in company stock, leading to higher concentra-
tions of company stock in 401(k) plans.2 2 Many plans also restrict employ-
ees from selling company stock contributed by the employer for long
periods of time, thereby significantly increasing concentration levels.23
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EMPLOYER COMMUNICATIONS
The growth of employee investors has resulted in a powerful and dis-
tinct method for a company to communicate with an identified group of
investors. Companies can certainly communicate with their employee in-
vestors through public documents and press releases, which are also made
to non-employee investors. By capitalizing on the employer-employee re-
lationship, however, companies can communicate with employee investors
in other ways such as through employee newsletters and publications, em-
ployee meetings, inter-office memoranda and e-mails, and employee on-
line chats. Some employer communications may address issues that relate
only to employment, such as employment benefits information, salary and
promotion policies, and sexual harassment policies. Other employer com-
munications may address more general information about the company,
its prospects, and its stock price.
Employer communications that address more general information
about the company may be made for a variety of purposes. They may be
made to respond to employee concerns about job security, such as when a
financially distressed company reassures its employees that the company
will remain in business. Or they may be made to educate employees and
improve morale, such as when a company facing criticism from journalists,
or facing investigation by a government agency, wants to give its side of the
story to its employees. And, finally, they may be made to stimulate em-
ployee investment in the company, such as when a company tells its em-
ployees that its stock price will improve or that its stock is undervalued.
The promotional nature of employer communications is demon-
strated by the type of statements made by Enron management to Enron
employees before the accounting irregularities were disclosed to the pub-
lic. Sometimes the promotional nature of the statements made by Enron
management addressed company performance. For example, at an Enron
employee meeting, Kenneth Lay, the Chairman of Enron, told employees:
[a]nd let me say we're well into the fourth quarter now, and the
fourth quarter's looking good. We'll end up the year in good
shape, will certainly meet the street's expectations and again it
22. See VanDerhei, supra note 7, at 5 (finding that 43% of companies having
company stock investment option in their 401 (k) plans required employer match-
ing contributions to be made in company stock).
23. See id. (finding that 60% of plans prohibit employees from selling em-
ployer stock until specified age and/or service requirement is met).
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will be a great year for Enron and Enron's shareholders. And, of
course, all of you in this room are also Enron shareholders. 24
In addition to promotional communications addressing company per-
formance, Enron management also made a series of promotional state-
ments concerning the price of the company's stock. In its
communications with employees, management often made predictions
about where the price would go in the future, and that place was always
up. For example, in a meeting with employees, Mr. Lay told employees
that "we're pleased with the growth that we've had in the stock price over
the last 18 months or so, but, indeed we think, in fact, it can go quite a bit
further, and not long term, but near term."25 He continued, "that we'll
see this stock price quite a bit higher even over the next year to 18
months."2 6 Management also made specific predictions as to stock price,
telling employees, for example, "that think even over the next several
months that there's a good chance that the stock price could be up as
much as fifty percent, and I think there's no reason to think that over the
next two years that we can't double it again, at least double it."27
In its employer communications, Enron management also compared
Enron stock favorably to other stocks and investment opportunities. For
example, at one employee meeting, Mr. Lay observed that "our sharehold-
ers got a total return of over 600 percent, about a sevenfold increase in
their investment during this decade. And that's one-and-a-half times the
return for the S&P 500 in what is now viewed as the largest or strongest
bull market in our history."28 When the price of Enron stock fell, Enron
management continually reassured employees that its stock was still a good
buy. For example, in an employee chat session held just a few months
before Enron declared bankruptcy, Mr. Lay told employees that "Enron
stock is an incredible bargain at current prices and we will look back a
couple of years from now and see the great opportunity that we currently
have." 29
All of these promotional statements were clearly intended to en-
courage employees to keep investing in Enron. However, if some employ-
ees failed to understand the implied message, Enron management also
24. See First Consolidated and Amended Complaint 248, Tittle v. Enron
Corp., No. H 01-3913, (S.D. Tex. Civ., filed Apr. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Enron
Complaint].
25. Id. 247.
26. Id. 247.
27. Id. 249 (statement of Joseph Sutton, Vice-Chairman of Enron).
28. Id. 246. In another employees' meeting, Mr. Lay told employees that
"[s]tarting early in 1999 and going through September of this year ... , Enron
Corp. shareholders have had over a 1,400-percent or over 15-fold, if you want to
put it that way, increase in their investment over that period of time. Obviously,
well over three times what the average has been for the S&P 500. They're in a
really strong bull market, the S&P 500. Id. 257.
29. Id. 269.
20031 1223
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sent an express message. Thus, for example, at an employees meeting, an
employee asked, "Should we invest all of our 401 (k) in Enron stock?"
Management's response, "absolutely," and added that "there's no reason
to think that we couldn't see a $15, $20, $25 increase in stock price over
the next 12 months or So.
"3
0
IV. EMPLOYEE INVESTORS ARE PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO
SECURITIES FRAUD
Employer communications permit companies to communicate with
an important segment of their investors-company employees. These em-
ployer communications can help employee investors make informed deci-
sions about purchasing company stock, so long as they are accurate.
However, they can also mislead employee investors. In fact, employer
communications pose a unique risk of misleading employee investors.
This danger is exacerbated because, given employees' trust in company
management, employees are more likely to believe the misleading em-
ployer communications. 3' Further, employee investors suffer dispropor-
tionately from misleading employer communications because they often
invest so heavily in company stock. Thus, employee investors are particu-
larly vulnerable to securities fraud.
A. Employer Communications Pose a Unique Risk of Misleading
Employee Investors
Employer communications pose a unique risk of misleading em-
ployee investors into purchasing or holding company stock. This danger
can be traced to the non-public, or secret, nature of employer communica-
tions, which increases the risk that the employer communication will be
misleading. As discussed above, companies communicate with their em-
ployees on an ongoing basis, through employee newsletters and publica-
tions, employee meetings, inter-office memoranda and e-mails, and
employee on-line chats.32 By definition, the communications made to em-
ployees are not disclosed to non-employee investors. They are not public,
and they are not required to be filed with the SEC.3 3 These communica-
30. Id. 250. These statements were made by Cindy K. Olson, an Enron Vice
President and a fiduciary of Enron's 401(k) plan.
31. For discussion of employee trust of company management, see infra Part
IV.B.
32. For discussion of the significance of employer communications, see supra
Part III.
33. Employer communications do not have to be filed under the selective
disclosure rules of Regulation FD. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2002). In general, Reg-
ulation FD requires companies to make public disclosure of material non-public
information that has been selectively disclosed to others. However, the selective
disclosure rules are triggered only when the company makes a disclosure "to any
person outside the issuer." See id. § 243.100(b)(1). Disclosures to a company's
own employees are not considered as "outside the issuer." See Selective Disclosure
and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 33-7787, [1999-2000 Transfer
1224 [Vol. 48: p. 1217
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tions are-for all intents and purposes-secret. Thus, employer commu-
nications are not subject to the usual regulatory forces that tend to
discourage corporate fraud. For example, analysts and journalists cannot
question the information contained in employer communications.
Healthy skepticism by market professionals helps keep companies honest.
If no effective challenge to the information exists, there is an increased
risk that the employer communication may be misleading.
Similarly, employer communications are more likely to be misleading
because the disciplining effect created by the prospect of a securities fraud
action is missing. The possibility of a securities fraud action helps deter a
company from making misleading statements. Conversely, if a securities
fraud action is unlikely, a company may be less careful to ensure the accu-
racy of its disclosures. Because employer communications are secret, a
securities fraud action for a misleading employer communication is not
very likely. Attorneys specializing in securities class actions, who may regu-
larly review press releases for misleading corporate disclosures, generally
will never see the employer communication and thus will not have the
opportunity to bring a securities fraud action if the employer communica-
tion was misleading. The secrecy also effectively prevents the SEC from
bringing an enforcement action against a company for misleading em-
ployer communications. If companies realize that employer communica-
tions are basically insulated from liability under the federal securities laws,
they may be more likely to make misleading disclosures to their employ-
ees. At the very least, companies may be careless about ensuring the accu-
racy of their employer communications.
B. Employees Are More Likely to Believe Misleading Employer Communications
Obviously, not all employer communications are false or misleading.
But when misleading employer communications are made, employees are
particularly vulnerable because they have a natural tendency to trust their
employer. 34 In other words, employees are more likely to believe fraudu-
lent employer communications. This vulnerability is demonstrated by En-
ron management's statements to employees prior to disclosing the
company's accounting problems.
As we all know, the Enron debacle was caused in part by significant
accounting irregularities. Even before Enron disclosed the full extent of
its problems, however, there were persistent rumors about questionable
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,228, at 82,846 (Dec. 20, 1999) (stating that
Regulation FD "would not apply to communications of confidential information by
officials and employees of issuers to each other"). Thus, Regulation FD does not
require companies to file employer communications with the SEC, even if they
contain material non-public information.
34. The impact of trust on corporate law has just begun to be addressed by
legal scholars. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthi-
ness, and the Behavioral Foundation of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001)
(using trust concepts to explain corporate fiduciary duties).
2003] 1225
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accounting practices at Enron. These rumors were known to Enron em-
ployees, and were consistently denied by Enron management. For exam-
ple, after a critical article about Enron appeared in The Wall Street Journal,
Jeffrey Skilling, Enron's Chief Executive Officer, told Enron employees,
"So I think the entire article was just, you know, it was just one of these
things that gets dredged up every couple of years. It has absolutely no
merit, no substance. Our accounting policies are not only appropriate, in
my opinion, they're conservatively executed. So we're in a strong position
from an accounting basis." 3 5 On several occasions, employees specifically
asked Enron management about its accounting practices and rumored ir-
regularities. Each time, management denied any problems, characterizing
these concerns as "unfounded rumors."3 6 For example, on September 26,
2001, shortly before Enron disclosed its accounting irregularities, an em-
ployee posed the following question to Kenneth Lay:
Mr. Lay-Enron has been aggressive in the use of SPVs [special
purpose vehicles] collateralizing future cash flows for the sake of
present earnings. I couldn't help but notice our auditor, Arthur
Andersen of Houston, recently admitted guilt and paid the larg-
est fine ever for criminal falsifications related to SPVs on behalf
of another large Houston corporation. You are a man of integ-
rity, so my "question" is a chance for you to reassure us we have
no such problems here at Enron.37
Mr. Lay responded:
To begin with, I can assure you that I or the Board of Directors
would not approve the use of SPVs or other types of financial
vehicles unless we were convinced both by all of our internal of-
fices as well as our external auditor and counsel, that they were
legal and totally appropriate. 38
As demonstrated by the phrasing of the employee's question, this em-
ployee believed that his employer would give him the full and honest
truth. Even with all of the available conflicting evidence-and by this
point in time, the rumors of accounting improprieties at Enron had
35. See Enron Complaint, supra note 24, 260. Similarly, after a negative arti-
cle appeared in Fortune Magazine, Mr. Lay told employees that "[t]he entire rea-
son that this analysis was done by 'Fortune Magazine' is because 'Business Week'
had a favorable article about Enron the week before. And there is this competition
that the news magazines have, where if one says something good, the other has to
come and find something bad." See id. 263. He concluded by reassuring employ-
ees that "the criticism ... is kind of ridiculous." See id.
36. See id. 269 & 271. Management also urged employees not to repeat
these rumors, pointing out that "[t]o the extent that our employees begin repeat-
ing those rumors and spreading those rumors to other employees as well as family
members and friends outside the company, it gives them a level of credibility that
they do not deserve. And, thus damages the stock price." See id. 269.
37. Id.
38. Id.
1226 [Vol. 48: p. 1217
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reached a dull roar-he still trusted this person and, presumably, believed
Kenneth Lay's statements denying any accounting irregularities. Why?
The answer must be that an employee is particularly likely to trust his
employer. This conclusion appears to be intuitive. Even without any un-
derstanding of social psychology or organizational behavior, most of us
would agree that an employee typically holds the senior management of
his employer in high esteem. The employee is conditioned to follow se-
nior managers. The employee's paycheck is signed by senior managers.
In effect, employees may view senior managers as benevolent dictators,
who have been entrusted with running the company and ensuring that the
employee has a livelihood. Given that, it is easy to conclude that employ-
ees place high levels of trust in senior managers, causing employees to be
likely to believe what they are told.
39
This intuitive feeling is supported by the findings of social psycholo-
gists who have explored the important question of why people trust. Not
surprisingly, this is a complex question, and different scholars have devel-
oped different theories of what causes trust. The literature suggests, how-
ever, that a person will trust another person when he perceives that the
trusted person possesses certain identified qualities or characteristics 
4 0
Although social psychologists have identified a variety of qualities that con-
39. Statements made by Enron employees also provide support for this con-
clusion. See supra note 1. Similarly, employees testifying before Senate and House
committees investigating Enron revealed how their trust in Enron management
was abused. For example, a retired Enron employee described to a Senate com-
mittee one of Enron's employer communications in which employees were told
that Enron's 2000 performance was "simply stunning" and that "[e]very one of our
businesses performed beyond our expectations." The employee then testified that
"[w]e believed in the story in this publication and it is typical of the type of promo-
tion used by Enron executives." See The Collapse of the Enron Corp.: An Overview of the
Enron Collapse; Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation,
107th Cong. (Dec. 18, 2001) (statement of Charles Prestwood, retired Enron
employee).
40. For example, one noted scholar identified nine trust conditions: (1) in-
tegrity; (2) motives; (3) consistency of behavior; (4) openness; (5) discreetness; (6)
finctional competence; (7) interpersonal competence; (8) business sense; and (9)
judgment. See J.J. Gabarro, The Development of Trust, Influence and Expectations, in
INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR: COMMUNICATION AND UNDERSTANDING IN RELATIONSHIPS
290 (A.G. Athos & J.J. Gabarro eds., 1978). Another study identified integrity,
competence, loyalty, consistency/fairness and openness as contributing towards
the establishment of employee trust. See Murray C. Clark & Roy L. Payne, The
Nature and Structure of Workers' Trust in Management, 18 J. ORG. BEHAV. 205, 208
(1997). See also Aneil K. Mishra, Organizational Responses to Crisis: The Centrality of
Trust, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 261
(Roderick M. Kramer & Tom T. Tyler eds., 1996) (identifying manager's compe-
tence, openness, concern and reliability as important in creating employee trust).
Similarly, the following categories of managerial behavior were found to lead to
employee trust: (1) behavioral consistency; (2) behavioral integrity; (3) sharing
and delegation of control; (4) communication; and (5) demonstration of concern.
See Ellen M. Whitener et al., Managers as Initiators of Trust: An Exchange Relationship
Framework for Understanding Managerial Trustworthy Behavior, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REv.
513, 516 (1998).
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tribute to one person trusting another, most scholars appear to agree that
the following characteristics contribute to trust in a managerial setting: (1)
the perceived integrity of the trusted person, (2) the perceived compe-
tence of the trusted person, and (3) the perceived openness of the trusted
person. In other words, if an employee perceives that management has
integrity, is competent, and regularly communicates with employees, the
employee is more likely to place his trust in management.
These conditions are often present in the relationship between an
employee and senior management. Obviously, different employees may
perceive different senior managers to have different levels of integrity, as
well as different levels of competence and openness. A review of the em-
ployee-senior manager relationship, however, indicates that employees in
general are apt to believe that senior managers are people of integrity.
Senior managers themselves may even foster this image. For example, se-
nior managers are often very publicly active in charitable work.4 1 Such
philanthropy may create a "halo effect" around senior management, lead-
ing to a perception that these managers are honest and forthright. In
addition, corporations often adopt mission statements and codes of ethics
that emphasize honest behavior. 42 By adopting-and preaching adher-
ence to-these ethical standards, senior managers hold themselves out as
people of high integrity, who would not lie to their employees. 43
In addition, it would appear that employees generally perceive senior
managers to be competent. By definition, senior managers have attained
the highest levels of responsibility in a corporation, which naturally leads
to a perception that these people have the skills required to do their jobs.
Otherwise, how would they have obtained such powerful positions?
Finally, as discussed above, senior managers often communicate with
employees on a regular basis.44 In fact, senior managers seeking to de-
velop and cultivate employee trust may deliberately become more accessi-
ble to their employees. Such employer communications and accessibility
undoubtedly lead employees to develop perceptions that senior manage-
ment is operating openly and honestly, leading to employee perception
that senior managers are trustworthy.
41. See, e.g., Surveys Document Surge in Volunteering, 18 NONPROFIT WORLD 40(Jan./Feb. 2000) (stating that 95% of CEOs of Fortune 500 companies volunteer
for at least one nonprofit corporation and 80% are on five or more nonprofit
boards).
42. Enron's ethics handbook provided that "[r]elations with the Company's
many publics-customers, stockholders, governments, employees, suppliers, press,
and bankers-will be conducted in honesty, candor, and fairness." See Enron
Complaint, supra note 24, 1 242.
43. At Enron, for example, senior managers "talked about respect and integ-
rity, and passed out paperweights that said so." See Rich Bragg, Enron's Collapse:
Workers Feel Pain of Layoffs and Added Sting of Betrayal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, at A-
1.
44. For a discussion of the significance of employer communications, see
supra Part III.
1228 [Vol. 48: p. 1217
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C. Employee Investors Suffer Disproportionately from Securities Fraud
All investors-employees and non-employees-suffer losses if a com-
pany commits securities fraud. However, because employee investors tend
to invest heavily in employer stock, they suffer disproportionately if their
employer defrauds them into purchasing or holding company stock.45
Thus, employees are particularly vulnerable to suffering significant losses
from misleading employer communications. 46
V. THE ANTI-FRAUD PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAwS Do
NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE VULNERABILITY OF
EMPLOYEE INVESTORS
As demonstrated above, 47 employee investors are particularly vulnera-
ble to securities fraud in large part because employer communications
45. For a discussion of the tendency of employees to invest in company stock,
see supra Part II.B.
46. Following Enron, there were calls to amend the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the primary federal statute regulating private
pension and retirement plans, to place caps on employee investment in employer
stock or to take other steps to prevent excessive employee investment in employer
securities such as educating employees about the value of diversification. See
Greenhouse, supra note 19, at C-1 (discussing calls for reform made by SenatorJon
S. Corzine, Democrat, New Jersey). Because laws that would have the effect of
reducing employee investment have so far proved to be quite controversial, Con-
gress has not enacted such legislation. See generally id. (discussing advantages and
disadvantages of cap on employee investment).
If Congress decides to place substantive restrictions or limitations on em-
ployee investment, the restrictions should not be made via the federal securities
laws. The goal of the federal securities laws is to promote informed investment
decisions. In other words, the federal securities laws do not seek to dictate invest-
ment choices or strategies. Instead, the approach of the federal securities laws is to
ensure that investors have adequate information so that they can make their own
choices. Therefore, a provision placing restrictions on employee ownership-such
as a cap-would be inconsistent with the disclosure philosophy underlying the fed-
eral securities laws. On the other hand, it would be entirely consistent with goals
of ERISA, which was enacted by Congress to protect the interests of employees in
their pensions, thereby helping to ensure that employees would have sufficient
savings for retirement. At the time ERISA became law, Congress was concerned
with concentrated holdings of employer securities in pension plans. In fact, ERISA
already imposes a cap on employer stock in defined benefit plans. See ERISA
§ 407(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2000). However, the decision to impose a cap on
ownership of employer stock in 401(k) plans implicates several competing policy
choices that are beyond the scope of this Article. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREAS., REP. ON
EMPLOYER STOCK IN 401 (K) PLANs 4-7 (Feb. 28, 2002) (arguing against mandatory
cap because it would interfere with employee's freedom to invest, it would reduce
employer matching contributions, and it would negatively impact U.S. trading
markets by forcing plans to sell large amounts of employer stock). Therefore, I
take no position on whether ERISA should impose such a cap, or impose any provi-
sion that would discourage concentrated ownership of employer securities. In-
stead, I merely conclude that it would be inappropriate for the federal securities
laws to impose such restrictions.
47. For discussion of the vulnerability of employee investors to securities
fraud, see supra Part IV.
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pose a special risk of misleading employees into purchasing or holding
company stock. Unfortunately, the anti-fraud provisions of the federal se-
curities laws do not adequately address this vulnerability. In fact, mislead-
ing employer communications fall outside most of the anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws. 48 Thus, defrauded employees go
uncompensated for their losses. And, perhaps more importantly, senior
management is not deterred from making misleading employer
communications.
The federal securities laws set forth several anti-fraud provisions, in-
cluding Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 ("'33 Act"), 49 Section
48. In addition, liability for many misleading employer communications
would also appear to fall outside the scope of ERISA. See Stabile, supra note 16, at
561 (stating that claims that misleading employer communication violated ERISA
would "not be easy lawsuits for plaintiffs"). ERISA imposes fiduciary duties on plan
fiduciaries. Specifically, Section 404(a) (1) of ERISA requires a plan fiduciary to
act "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries" of the plan. See
ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000). It is clear that misrepresenta-
tions made by a fiduciary in a fiduciary capacity violate the fiduciary duties im-
posed by ERISA, subjecting the fiduciary to liability under ERISA. See Varity Corp.
v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506-07 (1996). As the Supreme Court reasoned, "lying is
inconsistent with the duty of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries and codified in Section
404(a) (1) of ERISA." Id. at 506. However, the law is very unclear as to what types
of statements can be attributable to a "fiduciary" while "acting in a fiduciary capac-
ity." For example, a court may well determine that an employer communication
made by a company or its management to its employees was not made in a fiduci-
ary capacity, but rather in an employer capacity or in a normal business operations
capacity. As a leading commentator noted, "[i]t remains to be seen whether a
court will decide that [employer communications urging employees to purchase
employer stock] were made in a fiduciary capacity and therefore give rise to ERISA
liability." See Stabile, supra note 16, at 563; see also Evan Miller & Allison Cera,
Learning the True Meaning of Fiduciary, the Hard Way, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12, 2002, at B-8
(concluding that existing case law "does not offer much guidance" on whether
misleading employer communications would be actionable under ERISA); Retire-
ment Insecurity: Crisis at Enron; Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
107th Cong. 128 (Feb. 5, 2002) (statement of Karen W. Ferguson, Director of Pen-
sion Rights Center) (asking Senate to amend ERISA to "make plain that company
officials, such as Enron CEO Kenneth Lay, who make misleading statements to
employees can be sued .... even if the officials claim that they had nothing to do
with the running of the plan"). Moreover, the company or its managers making
the employer communication may not even be an ERISA fiduciary. See Retirement
Insecurity: Crisis at Enron; Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
107th Cong. 148 (Feb. 5, 2002) (statement of Erik Olsen, Director of AARP)
(pointing out that Enron plan participants may be left with no remedy against
Enron CEO Kenneth Lay because he might not constitute ERISA "fiduciary").
49. Section 11 provides:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became
effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to
state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make
the statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring such secur-
ity ... may ... sue-
(1) every person who signed the registration statement;
(2) every person who was a director of ... the issuer at the time of
the filing of the part of the registration statement with respect to which
his liability is asserted;
1230
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12(a) (2) of the '33 Act, 511 Section 17 of the '33 Act, 51 Section 18 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("'34 Act"), 52 and Rule 10b-5 of the '34
Act. 53 These anti-fraud provisions-which may adequately serve non-em-
(3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration
statement as being or about to become a director... ;
(4) every accountant... with respect to the statement in such regis-
tration statement .... which purports to have been prepared or certified
by him;
(5) every underwriter with respect to such security.
Securities Act of 1933 § 11 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2000). For further discussion of
Section 11, see THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 7.3 (4th
ed. 2002).
50. Section 12(a)(2) provides:
Any person who ... offers or sells a security ... by means of a prospectus
or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of material
fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading ... shall be liable . . . to the person purchasing such security
from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of compe-
tent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with
interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon
the tender of such security, or for any damages if he no longer owns the
security.
Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(a) (2) (2000). For further discus-
sion of Section 12(a) (2), see HAZEN, supra note 49, § 7.6.
51. Section 17 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities...
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement
of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances tinder
which they were made, not misleading; or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2000). For further discussion
of Section 17, see HAZEN, supra note 49, § 7.11.
52. Section 18 of the '34 Act provides:
Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any
application, report, or document filed pursuant to this [title] .... which
statement was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under
which it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact,
shall be liable to any person (not knowing that such statement was false
or misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have pur-
chased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement,
for damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove
that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement
was false or misleading.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (2000). For further discus-
sion of Section 18, see HAZEN, supra note 49, § 12.18.
53. Rule 10b-5 provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person ...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or
15
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ployee investors-generally fail employee investors who have been de-
frauded by misleading employer communications.
Several of these anti-fraud provisions are simply not applicable to mis-
leading employer communications. For example, Section 11 of the '33
Act does not reach misleading employer communications because the
fraudulent statements to employees would not have appeared in the com-
pany's registration statement. Similarly, Section 18 of the '34 Act does not
help because employer communications are not filed with the SEC. The
remaining anti-fraud provisions may reach employer communications, but
are inadequate remedies for fraud. For example, Section 12(a) (2) of the
'33 Act provides only limited relief for misleading employer communica-
tions. Because Section 12(a) (2) imposes liability only for misleading state-
ments made in connection with a public offering, 54 Section 12(a) (2) does
not reach misleading employer communications that are made when the
company is not making a public offering of securities. That means that
most employer communications-those made during the day-to-day oper-
ations of a company-will not be subject to the employer liability under
Section 12(a) (2).
In addition, Section 17 of the '33 Act does not adequately address
misleading employer communications. Because most courts have refused
to imply a private right of action under Section 17,5 5 employees who have
been defrauded by a misleading employer communication cannot recover
under Section 17. The SEC would be able to bring an enforcement action
against an employer for a misleading employer communication, but that
relief is more illusory than real. For the SEC to be able to bring suit, it
would have to be aware of the misleading employer communications.
However, as discussed above, employer communications are not disclosed
to the public and are not filed with the SEC. 56 Thus, Section 17 does not
provide much help to employees defrauded by misleading employer com-
(c) To engage in any act practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security.
Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002). For further dis-
cussion of Rule lOb-5, see HAZEN, supra note 49, § 12.4.
54. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995). In Gustafson, the Su-
preme Court interpreted "prospectus" as "a term of art referring to a document
that describes a public offering of securities by an issuer or controlling share-
holder." See id. at 584. Thus, written employer communications are not prospec-
tuses within the meaning of Section 12. For additional discussion of Gustafson, see
Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing Without a Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933
Securities Act, 75 WAsn. L. REv. 429, 456-61 (2000).
55. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Dominguez, 137 F.3d 1, 7 (lst Cir. 1998) (stating
that "[i]n recent years, every circuit to have addressed the issue has refused to
recognize a private right of action under Section 17(a), including four circuits
which originally had held otherwise").
56. For further discussion of how employer communications are secret, see
supra Part W.A.
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munications, nor does it deter senior managers from making misleading
employer communications.
Finally, Rule lOb-5 provides relief for some misleading employer com-
munications, but allows many-if not most-misleading employer com-
munications to go unremedied. In order to bring suit under Rule 10b-5, a
plaintiff must first meet the standing requirement and have either pur-
chased or sold a security. 57 Thus, employees who have been fraudulently
induced to hold their employer's stock by a misleading employer commu-
nication will not be able to recover under Rule lOb-5. Considering that
many employees already own large amounts of employer stock when mis-
leading employer communications are made,5 8 the standing requirement
will prevent them from being able to recover a significant portion of their
damages when the truth finally is disclosed and the value of their stock
plummets. Because senior managers will not be liable for these presuma-
bly large damages, Rule lOb-5 fails to adequately deter misleading em-
ployer communications. 59
VI. WHAT SHOULD THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAws Do TO ADDRESS
THIS VULNERABILI'y?
A. Purchaser/Seller Standing Requirement Should Not Be Changed
If employees who have been defrauded into holding company securi-
ties could sue under Rule 10b-5, companies would certainly be deterred
from making misleading employer communications. Thus, one obvious
way to address the vulnerability of employee investors would be for courts
to create an exception to the standing requirement set forth in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores6 ° that would permit employees to sue under
Rule lOb-5, even if they have not purchased or sold employer securities.
For several reasons, however, I do not advocate the recognition of stand-
ing for employees who are fraudulently induced to hold employer
securities.
57. This standing requirement was imposed by the Supreme Court in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). For further discussion of the
Blue Chip Stamps standing requirement, see infra Part VI.A.
58. For further discussion of how and why employee stock portfolios are con-
centrated in employer stock, see supra Part II.B.
59. Arguably, a new white collar crime created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), the first statutory response to the
corporate scandals typified by Enron, might deter some misleading employer com-
munications. Section 807 provides that "[w]hoever knowingly executes, or at-
tempts to execute, a scheme or artifice ... to defraud any person in connection
with any security of a [reporting company] ... shall be fined under this title, or
imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both." See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1348 (West Supp.
2002). However, any deterrent value will be realized only if the government de-
cides to enforce this section. It remains to be seen whether the enforcement of
white collar crime will become a priority of the federal government.
60. 421 U.S. 731 (1975).
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First, it would be extremely difficult for courts to fashion such an ex-
ception without violating the Supreme Court's holding in Blue Chip Stamps.
Theoretically, I suppose, it could be done. A court could take the position
that the holding of Blue Chip Stamps was based in part on an interpretation
of the language of Rule 10b-5,61 but was based predominantly on policy
considerations. 62 Further, upon a close examination of the case, a court
could rule that extending standing to employees who were fraudulently
induced to hold employer securities would not necessarily frustrate the
policy considerations articulated in Blue Chip Stamps. The Supreme Court
expressed those policy considerations in a frequently cited part of its opin-
ion, limiting standing to actual purchasers and sellers because "litigation
under Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree
and kind from that that accompanies litigation in general."6 3 In particu-
lar, the Court noted that Rule 10b-5 created a potential for strike suits,
primarily due to discovery abuses which encouraged companies to settle
even frivolous actions. However, the concern over strike suits has been
expressly addressed by Congress in the Private Securities Litigation Re-
61. In Blue Chip Stamps, the Supreme Court reasoned that because the lan-
guage of Rule 10b-5 prohibited fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale" of
a security, standing should be limited to actual purchasers or sellers. See Blue Chip
Stamps, 421 U.S. at 731. The Court also noted that the express private rights of
action under the federal securities laws expressly limited standing to actual pur-
chasers or sellers. See id. at 735-36.
The Supreme Court also indicated that it was willing to deny standing under
Rule 1Ob-5 to holders in part because of the existence of remedies for non-pur-
chasers and non-sellers under state law. See id. at 738 n.9. Employees who have
been induced into holding securities by a misleading employer communication
may still have a state law remedy, even with the passage of the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998. The Uniform Standards Act preempts most class
actions based on misleading statements made "in connection with the purchase or
sale" of a security. See Securities Act of 1933 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2000);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(f)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f) (1) (2000). Courts
have interpreted the Uniform Standards Act's "in connection with" requirement to
mean that plaintiffs who allege that they were defrauded into holding their securi-
ties escape preemption. See, e.g., Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590, 598 (8th
Cir. 2002) (holding that "our inquiry leads us inevitably to the conclusion that
nonsellers and nonpurchasers of securities are not covered by SLUSA's preemp-
tion provision"). But see Joshua D. Ratner, Comment, Stockholders' Holding Claim
Class Actions Under State Law After the Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1035, 1036 (2001) (arguing that state law holding claims are implicitly pre-
empted by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and Uniform Stan-
dards Act). To the extent that employees who have been defrauded into holding
employer securities can still sue under state law, the argument for an expanded
standing rule is undercut.
62. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737-55 (stating that "[i]t is therefore
proper that we consider, in addition to the factors already discussed, what may be
described as policy considerations when we come to flesh out the portions of the
law with respect to which neither the congressional enactment nor the administra-
tive regulations offer conclusive guidance").
63. Id.
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form Act of 1995 (PSLRA) 64 and the Securities Litigation Uniform Stan-
dards Act of 1998,65 thereby undercutting part of the Court's justification
for limiting standing to actual purchasers and sellers.
Moreover, the Court determined that permitting holders to sue
under Rule lOb-5 would also lead to strike suits because it would "throw
open to the trier of fact many rather hazy issues of historical fact the proof
of which depended almost entirely on oral testimony." 66 In other words,
the Court was concerned that a plaintiff who claims he was defrauded into
holding a security could get to the jury simply by presenting uncorrobo-
rated oral evidence. After the procedural reforms enacted by Congress in
the PSLRA, this concern is greatly diminished simply because it is now
much more difficult for any plaintiff to get to a jury, even with corrobo-
rated evidence.6 7 Finally, the Supreme Court limited standing to actual
purchasers and sellers because it recognized that permitting holders of
securities to sue would create a huge class of potential plaintiffs, especially
since so many Rule lOb-5 claims arise in anonymous open market trading
transactions. 68 Since a company's employees would constitute a defined-
64. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). In gen-
eral, the PSLRA imposed stringent procedural requirements on securities actions
brought in federal court, such as a heightened pleading requirement and an auto-
matic stay of discovery upon a motion to dismiss. For an in-depth discussion of the
PSLRA, see generally Symposium on the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
51 Bus. LAw. 975 (1996).
65. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). In
the Uniform Act, Congress responded to criticisms that plaintiffs were circum-
venting the procedural reforms instituted by the PSLRA by filing state securities
fraud actions in state court, preempting most class actions based on misleading
statements made in connection with the purchase or sale of security. See generally
Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities
Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1998); Michael A. Perino, Fraud and
Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REv.
273 (1998).
66. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 743.
67. For example, the PSLRA imposed a heightened pleading requirement
which requires that a complaint "shall state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2000). For an in-
depth discussion of the heightened pleading requirement, see generally Hillary A.
Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA's
Internal-Information Standard on the '33 and '34 Act Claims, 76 WASii. U. L.Q. 537
(1998).
68. In addition, according to the Supreme Court, the existence of anonymous
open market trading in many Rule 10b-5 actions justified the Blue Chip Stamps
standing requirement in another way. The Supreme Court noted that the actual
purchaser or seller standing requirement had been abandoned by some state
courts, permitting investors who had been defrauded into holding their securities
to sue for misrepresentation or deceit under state law. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421
U.S. at 744-46. The Supreme Court distinguished these state cases, noting that the
state cases often involved face-to-face transactions. As the Court noted, in the state
cases "the plaintiff and the defendant had concededly been engaged in the course
20031 1235
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and limited-class of potential plaintiffs, this concern would be reduced,
perhaps justifying an exception to the Blue Chip Stamps standing
requirement.
Even if a court were somehow able to create an exception to the ac-
tual purchaser or seller standing requirement without violating Blue Chip
Stamps, the value of deterring misleading employer communications
would be far outweighed by the cost of an expanded standing rule. Specif-
ically, there would be a real concern that companies would decide to cur-
tail communications with their employees, rather than risk opening
themselves up to potential liability under Rule 10b-5. Companies would
continue to communicate with employees about employment issues, but
might decide to reduce, or eliminate, employer communications relating
to more general information about the company and its prospects. This
would be unfortunate. When complete and accurate, employer communi-
cations about the company and its prospects help employees make in-
formed investment decisions about whether or not to purchase employer
securities. But an expanded standing rule would probably mean that com-
panies would discontinue making certain types of employer communica-
tions, even those that are helpful to an employee's investment decision.
Considering that the federal securities laws are grounded on a philosophy
of promoting informed investment decisions, 69 adopting a standing rule
that would result in less information reaching employees is troubling.
It is also troubling for another reason, beyond the potential interfer-
ence with the goals of the federal securities laws. The information con-
tained in employer communications has a significance apart from an
employee's investment decision. Employers may want to communicate
general information about the company and its prospects for reasons that
have nothing to do with encouraging employee investment. For example,
the company may want to help employees better understand the com-
pany's business, or may want to increase productivity or raise morale. An
expanded standing rule might therefore impede a company's ability to
conduct its normal business operations. In addition, employees may want
to receive employer communications that provide general information
about the company and its prospects. After all, many employees expend
considerable time, effort, and emotional energy in their jobs. Because
they have a vested interest in the success or failure of their employer,
of business dealings with one another, and would presumably have recognized one
another on the street had they met." See id. at 745. Thus, the Court recognized
that permitting holders to sue in these more personal transactions might make
sense, but would not make sense in many Rule 10b-5 actions, where the company
and the investor have no relationship. Since employees do have some sort of rela-
tionship to the employer and its management, a court could argue that employees
who have been defrauded into holding employer securities should be permitted to
bring suit under Rule 10b-5.
69. See, e.g., Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION § 1-G (3d
ed. 1998) (discussing battle of philosophies that was ultimately won by proponents
of disclosure philosophy at expense of "merit" philosophy).
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adopting a standing rule that would deprive them of information about
their employer would not be viewed favorably by many employees.
B. Employer Communications Should Be Disclosed to the SEC
If an expanded standing rule is not the answer to the vulnerability of
employees to securities fraud committed by their employer, then what can
the federal securities laws do? The answer is, as it often is under the fed-
eral securities laws, mandated disclosure. As discussed above, the non-
public nature of employer communications increases the risk that em-
ployer communications will be misleading.70 It also decreases the chance
that a securities fraud action will be brought for a misleading employer
communication. If the problem is the secrecy, then the secrecy should be
stopped. If companies were required to disclose employer communica-
tions to the SEC, the employer communications would be subjected to
critical scrutiny by outsiders. They would also be subjected to a realistic
chance of potential liability under Section 17 of the '33 Act and under
Rule 10b-5 of the '34 Act, making it less likely that employees will be mis-
led into investing in company stock. Thus, the SEC should promulgate a
rule requiring companies to disclose employer communications to the
SEC.
Requiring disclosure of employer communications sounds like an
easy solution, but, in actuality, it raises a series of complex questions.
Which employer communications should be disclosed? How should em-
ployer communications be disclosed? Will mandated disclosure of em-
ployer communications chill disclosure between the company and its
employees? Each of these questions is addressed below.
1. Which Employer Communications Should Be Disclosed to the SEC?
Obviously, a company should not be required to disclose all employer
communications to the SEC. Employers communicate with their employ-
ees on a wide variety of matters, many of which have nothing to do with an
employee's decision to invest in company stock. Certainly, the federal se-
curities laws are concerned only with those employer communications that
could potentially affect an employee's investment decision. Furthermore,
since the concern is that employers may use employer communications to
mislead employees into investing in employer stock, the employer commu-
nications that should be regulated are those that have the propensity to
cause employee investors to hold their employer's stock or purchase addi-
tional shares of company stock. Since employers are unlikely to make em-
ployer communications that will mislead investors into selling company
stock, it does not appear to be necessary to require the disclosure of em-
ployer communications that may cause employees to dis-invest in their
70. For discussion of the secret nature of employer communications, see
supra Part IV.A.
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company. 7 1 In other words, companies should be required to disclose
only those employer communications that are reasonably likely to cause
employees to purchase company stock or to refrain from selling company
stock. 72
There are several types of employer communications that would meet
this standard. For example, employer communications that favorably
characterize the company's stock price or future stock price, or that favor-
ably compare the company's stock to other investment opportunities, are
the most obvious types of employer communications that would en-
courage employee investors to purchase or hold additional employer
stock. In addition, more general statements that are promotional in na-
ture might also have a propensity to cause employees to hold or purchase
company stock. For example, an employer communication that discusses
potential growth opportunities might cause employees to decide to invest
in employer stock. 73, Similarly, employer communications denying bad
news can also significantly affect an employee's investment decision. That
was certainly the case in Enron, where senior management repeatedly
urged employees to ignore the reports of accounting irregularities,
thereby persuading employees to remain invested in Enron stock.74
71. There does not appear to be any good reason to require companies to
disclose employer communications that have a propensity to mislead employee
investors into selling their company stock. In general, companies desire employee
investment. See supra Part II.A. The real concern is that companies make mislead-
ing employer communications to encourage-not discourage-employee invest-
ment. Therefore, companies are unlikely to issue misleading employer
communications that would encourage employees to dis-invest.
72. The "reasonably likely to cause employees to purchase company stock or
to refrain from selling company stock" standard bears some resemblance to the
definition of materiality set forth by the Supreme Court in TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), but it differs in several important respects.
First, and most obviously, bad news could constitute material information because
there is a "substantial likelihood that a reasonable [investor] would consider [bad
news] important in deciding how to [act]." See id. at 449. Because the disclosure
of bad news would be reasonably likely to cause employees to sell-not hold or
purchase-company stock, employer communications disclosing bad news would
not meet the employer communication standard and, therefore, would not have to
be disclosed to the SEC. Moreover, in TSC Industries, the Supreme Court made
clear that the definition of materiality "does not require proof a substantial likeli-
hood that disclosure of the ... fact would have caused the reasonable investor to
change his [decision]." See id. All that TSC Industries requires is that the investor
consider the information important. See id. On the other hand, the employer
communication standard requires more than a finding that the employee consid-
ered the employer communication to be important. It requires a showing that
there is a reasonable likelihood that the employee would purchase or hold com-
pany stock.
73. For example, Enron management touted several "recent developments"
to their employees, including a "billion-dollar contract" with Blockbuster, that was
later disclosed to be a failure. See Enron Complaint, supra note 24, 256-58.
74. For good examples of the misleading statements made by Enron manage-
ment to employees, see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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In addition, a company should be required to disclose to the SEC only
those communications that are widely disseminated to all or substantially
all of the company's employees. 75 The intention behind this restriction is
to draw a distinction between communications made to employees gener-
ally and communications targeted to individual employees or a specific
group of employees. Thus, communications made via company-wide e-
mails, newsletters and employee meetings would have to be disclosed, so
long as they had a propensity to cause employees to invest in employer
stock. On the other hand, a statement made by a CEO during a meeting
with a selected group of employees would not have to be disclosed to the
SEC, even if the CEO's statement would be likely to cause those employees
to purchase or hold company stock. This distinction recognizes that only
those employer communications that pose the most danger of defrauding
a company's employees should be disclosed. The distinction also recog-
nizes that communications that are not widely disseminated are more
likely to have been made in connection with a company's normal business
operations, rather than in an attempt to affect the investment decisions of
the company's employees. Because employer communications that are
widely disseminated to employees are so easy to make and can so easily
reach such a large number of potential investors, they ought to be
regulated.
In summary, then, the SEC should promulgate a rule requiring re-
porting companies to disclose all employer communications that (1) are
widely disseminated to company employees; and (2) are reasonably likely
to cause employees to purchase company stock or to refrain from selling
company stock.
2. How Should the Employer Communications Be Disclosed?
Employer communications should be publicly disclosed to the SEC so
that they can be viewed byjournalists, market professionals, attorneys, and
other interested investors. But how should public disclosure to the SEC be
made? In general, disclosures can be made to the SEC in two different
ways: byfilinga document with the SEC or by furnishing a document to the
SEC. Whether a document must be filed or furnished is important for
several reasons. First, Section 18 of the '34 Act contains an express private
right of action for misleading statements appearing in a document filed
with the SEC.7 6 Thus, filed documents are potentially subjected to addi-
tional liability under the federal securities laws, while furnished docu-
ments are not. Second, filed documents are automatically incorporated by
75. Presumably, employer communications that are widely disseminated to
company employees would be made by senior managers of the company. Thus,
the kind of communications that an employee would most likely trust and that
would be most likely to cause an employee to purchase or hold employer stock
would have to be disclosed to the SEC.
76. For the text of Section 18, see supra note 52.
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reference into a company's short form registration statements, 77 which ex-
poses the company to potential liability under Section 11 of the '33 Act
78
and Section 12(a) (2) of the '33 Act.79 Thus, if the SEC were to require
employers to file communications with the SEC, companies might choose
not to make any communications at all, in order to avoid -the increased
risk of liability under the federal securities laws.
And, in fact, in other contexts, the SEC has recognized that imposing
a filing requirement might lead to a significant chilling effect on voluntary
company communications and has therefore permitted disclosure to be
made by furnishing the information to the SEC. For example, in promul-
gating the selective disclosure rules under Regulation FD 8 t1-which re-
quire companies disclosing material non-public information to certain
market professionals to make disclosure to the public as well-the SEC
realized that requiring companies to file their informal communications
withthe SEC could cause companies to limit their disclosures to market
professionals. 8 ' To prevent this undesirable result, the SEC permitted
companies to meet their disclosure requirements under Regulation FD by
furnishing the mandated information to the SEC.8 2
The circumstances of selective disclosure are quite similar to em-
ployer communications. They both involve a company making a voluntary
communication. In other words, the federal securities laws generally do
not require a company to disclose information to market professionals or
to its employees. Rather, in each case, the company chooses to make
these disclosures. In addition, in each case, the voluntary disclosures may
promote informed investment decisions. And, assuming the SEC adopts
77. See Registration Statement on Form S-2, Item 12(a) (2) (stating that all
reports "filed" under the '34 Act will be incorporated by reference into the Regis-
tration Statement on Form S-2); Registration Statement on Form S-3, Item
12(a) (2) (same).
78. For the text of Section 11, see supra note 49.
79. For the text of Section 12(a) (2), see supra note 50.
80. Regulation FD provides:
Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses any ma-
terial nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities to any
[market professional], the issuer shall make public disclosure of that in-
formation ... :
(1) Simultaneously, in the case of an intentional disclosure; and
(2) Promptly, in the case of a non-intentional disclosure.
See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2002).
81. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No.
33-7881, Part II.B.4.a, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,319, at
83,687 (Aug. 15, 2000). Responding to concerns that disclosure of informal com-
munications would be an admission as to the materiality of the communications,
the SEC wrote: "In light of these comments, we provide that either filing or fur-
nishing information on Form 8-K to satisfy Regulation FD will not, by itself, be
deemed an admission as to the materiality of the information." Id.
82. Regulation FD provides that "an issuer shall make the 'public disclosure'
of information required.., by furnishing to or filing with the Commission a Form
8-K... disclosing that information." See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e) (2002).
[Vol. 48: p. 12171240
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my proposed rule, in each case, the voluntary disclosures would trigger a
mandatory disclosure requirement under the federal securities laws.
Thus, the SEC must be careful not to adopt a rule that would discourage
companies from making voluntary disclosures. To avoid a potential chil-
ling effect, the SEC should require that companies disclose employer com-
munications by furnishing-rather than filing-the information with the
SEC.8
3
3. Will Mandated Disclosure of Employer Communications Chill Disclosures
Between the Company and Its Employees?
Because employer communications can be beneficial to employees,
and because employer communications may be used by a company to con-
duct its business operations, mandated disclosure should not be adopted if
it would chill disclosures from the company to its employees. Requiring a
company to furnish its employer communications with the SEC will not
have a chilling effect. First, mandating the disclosure of employer com-
munications will not expose companies to an unreasonable risk of litiga-
tion under the federal securities laws. As previously demonstrated,
limiting standing for violations of Rule lOb-5 to actual purchasers and sell-
ers8 4 and permitting companies to disclose employer communications by
furnishing, rather than filing, the information with the SEC 85 substantially
alleviates a company's liability concern. If a company makes a misleading
employer communication, the company would be subject to an SEC en-
forcement action and/or a private Rule lOb-5 action by employees who
have purchased company stock. These actions are already available under
present law. 86 Thus, requiring disclosure of employer communications
will not create any new liabilities for companies; it will merely create a
realistic chance that an action for a violation will be brought.
Moreover, the disclosure requirement should not impose significant
out-of-pocket costs on companies. In fact, it would be relatively inexpen-
sive for a company to disclose the most common types of employer com-
munications, those made by e-mail, memorandum, or newsletter. Copies
of these documents can simply be forwarded on to the SEC to meet the
disclosure requirement. Oral communications made at employee meet-
ings would have to be transcribed so that a written document could be
furnished to the SEC, but this would be a minor expense. Similarly, the
83. In addition, the SEC should require that the employer communication be
furnished to the SEC within a reasonable time after it was made to the company's
employees and must be made accessible through EDGAR, the SEC's Electronic
Data Gathering and Retrieval Service.
84. For further discussion of the Rule lOb-5 standing requirement, see supra
Part VI.A.
85. For further discussion of why I recommend the furnishing, and not filing,
of employer communications with the SEC, see supra Part VI.B.
86. For a list of actions available under current law, see supra notes 49-53 and
accompanying text.
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company would not see an appreciable increase in legal expenses. A com-
pany might choose to have counsel review its employer communications
before they are transmitted to employees, but this review would not be
onerous or overly burdensome. At most, it would resemble the type of
review attorneys presently conduct of a company's press releases.
Nor could companies complain that mandated disclosure of em-
ployer communications would require companies to disclose confidential
information to the public. Because making information widely available
decreases the probability that it will remain confidential, it seems unlikely
that companies actually disclose any confidential information to their em-
ployees through widely disseminated employer communications. There-
fore, it seems doubtful that a company could realistically argue that
requiring disclosure of employer communications would somehow harm a
company's competitive position.
The only real cost associated with the mandated disclosure of em-
ployer communications might be that informality is sacrificed. A company
might complain that requiring employer communications to be disclosed
to the SEC will inject a needless level of formality into its employer com-
munications. In other words, because companies will realize that their
communications will be furnished to the SEC, senior management may be
forced to watch every word they say to their employees, for fear of future
litigation. Actually, this is not a bad result at all. In fact, this kind of disci-
plining effect is one of the goals of requiring disclosure of employer
communications.
VII. CONCLUSION
Enron illustrated the kinds of sad stories that can result from mislead-
ing employer communications. Specifically, a company can communicate
directly with its employees, urging them to invest in company stock. The
employees then respond by purchasing additional shares of stock or by
holding onto the stock they already own. Then the company publicly dis-
closes information that shows that its employer communications were mis-
leading, and the stock price plunges, causing the employees to suffer
substantial losses, Strangely enough, these kinds of employer communica-
tions-although they clearly affect the investment decisions of company
employees-are left largely unregulated by the federal securities laws.
Considering the significance of employee investment in companies, and
the particular vulnerability of employees to securities fraud committed by
their employer, this is a shocking regulatory gap. To fill this gap, the SEC
should promulgate a rule requiring reporting companies to disclose all
employer communications that are widely disseminated to company em-
ployees and that are reasonably likely to cause employees to purchase
company stock or to refrain from selling company stock. Requiring disclo-
sure of employer communications would have a disciplining effect on se-
nior management without chilling the disclosure of information by
26
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employers to their employees. Although modest in scope, such a rule
would help ensure that there are no sequels to the sad stories told by En-
ron employees.
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